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I. INTRODUCTION

On January 2, 2001, Albert Burrell walked out of the Louisiana
State Penitentiary at Angola as a free man after spending thirteen
years on death row for a crime he did not commit. With tears of
joy and relief welling up in his eyes, and clutching a memo he had
received from the prison indicating that he was being released “by
virtue of court order,” Albert was met at Angola’s front gate by his
sister, who greeted him with a warm, emotional embrace. Also
present were newspaper and television reporters, all eagerly
clamoring with questions. Albert was clearly overwhelmed and had
little to say. As he stepped into his sister’s truck, he paused, and in
response to the oft-repeated question from the reporters of how he
felt, Albert simply said: “It’s good to be free.”
Truer words could not have been spoken, and few can know
the meaning of those words quite like Albert. I felt proud and
privileged to be with him on that day.
II. THE MURDER OF WILLIAM DELTON FROST
AND CALLIE MAUDE FROST
In 1986, over Labor Day weekend, William Delton Frost and
Callie Maude Frost were murdered in their home near Downsville,
Louisiana. Downsville is a very small town in rural northern
Louisiana, located not far from the Arkansas border. It is part of
Union Parish. The parish seat, as well as the courthouse, are in
nearby Farmerville, Louisiana.
The Frosts were a poor, elderly couple. They had no children
and lived alone in what newspaper reports termed a “modest
home”—really nothing more than a two-room shack. It was the
house where Mr. Frost had been raised. Mrs. Frost was disabled
and reportedly “had to be carried everywhere” by her husband.
The Frosts subsisted on social security and on money Mr. Frost
1
made as a “peddler of watermelons.”
1. Molly May, Downsville Couple Found Murdered in Living Room, NEWS-STARWORLD, Sept. 3, 1986, at 1A; Rhonda Smith, Couple’s Murder Shocks Rural
Community, NEWS-STAR-WORLD (Monroe, La.), Sept. 4, 1986, at 1A.
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Union Parish deputies discovered the murder on Monday
afternoon, September 1, 1986, Labor Day, after a neighbor notified
the sheriff’s office that he was concerned about not having seen
Mr. Frost. Mr. Frost’s body was found lying on the floor near the
front door of the Frosts’ house. He had been shot once in the
head. The police found Mrs. Frost’s body seated in a chair with a
gunshot wound to her face. The police believed that each of the
victims was killed by a single shot from a .22-caliber weapon,
probably a rifle, fired through a window from outside the house.
The police further believed that robbery was the motive for the
killings. Apparently, the Frosts kept what little money they had in a
suitcase under their bed. The police were unable to locate such a
suitcase after the murder.
The investigation went badly from the very beginning. The
police found almost no evidence at the scene of the crime. They
could not detect any fingerprints or fiber evidence. They ruined
the only footprint found while attempting to make a plaster cast of
it. Several police cameras broke after only a few pictures were
taken of the scene. In general, the only physical evidence obtained
was some blood found on a door molding. The police theorized
that after killing the Frosts from outside the house, the murderers
broke in, one cutting himself in the process, and robbed the Frosts.
Weeks went by, but the police were unable to solve the
murders, which were big news in northern Louisiana. The
community was shocked by the crime, and concerned that the
2
police had been unable to make any arrests. Although they
questioned a number of people, they had no solid leads and no
suspects. The FBI offered its assistance, but Union Parish Sheriff
Larry Averitt turned it down.
III. THE CONVICTIONS OF ALBERT BURRELL AND MICHAEL GRAHAM
On Sunday, October 12, 1986, six weeks after the murders,
police investigators received what they thought was their first real
lead when Janet Burrell called Sheriff Averitt at home. Janet
Burrell was the ex-wife of Albert Burrell and had been in a bitter
dispute with Albert over the custody of their son. Albert had been
awarded custody, and he and his son lived with Albert’s mother,
Gladys, in Choudrant, Louisiana. Janet Burrell was remarried to
2. Christopher Baughman and Tom Guarisco, Justice for None, BATON ROUGE
ADVOCATE, March 18, 2001, at 1A (first article in a three-part series).
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Albert’s brother, James Burrell.
Janet told the sheriff that she met Albert twice on Sunday
night, August 31st, to talk about their son. According to Janet’s
description, she and Albert had arranged to meet at a designated
spot on a rural road around 8:30 p.m. At the 8:30 meeting, Albert
allegedly said that he could not stay and asked Janet to come back
at 11:00 p.m. Janet claimed that she returned at 11:00 p.m., but
Albert did not arrive until 11:30. Janet said that when Albert
showed up, she got in his car, moved some clothes out of the way
and found a wallet. Janet claimed that the wallet contained Delton
Frost’s driver’s license and social security card. Janet further
claimed that Albert then counted out twenty-seven $100 bills and
said that he had taken the money from Mr. Frost. Janet said that
Albert claimed to have shot into the Frosts’ house, busted open
their door, and taken Mr. Frost’s wallet. She also said that she saw
blood on Albert’s boots. Based upon Janet’s statement, Albert was
arrested later that day.
Following Albert Burrell’s arrest, the police investigation
implicated Michael Graham in the murders. This implication was
based upon statements they received from Kenneth St. Clair, who
himself had at one time been a suspect, other members of the St.
Clair family, and a teenage girl, Amy Opal, who had been a
houseguest of the St. Clairs. All claimed that Graham and Burrell
had been seen together the night of the murders at the St. Clair
home, that they had been counting money out of a suitcase, and
that Graham had blood on his arm and shirt.
Based on this evidence, Albert and Michael were indicted by a
grand jury for murdering the Frosts. Almost immediately following
the indictment, a prisoner housed in the same cell with Michael
Graham at the Union Parish Jail, Olan Wayne Brantley, told the
sheriff’s office that Michael had admitted that he and Burrell had
killed and robbed the Frosts. With this jailhouse snitch testimony,
the district attorney’s office took Michael to trial in May of 1987.
He was found guilty and sentenced to death.
After Michael’s conviction, Olan Wayne Brantley again came
forward—this time with information allegedly implicating Albert.
Brantley claimed that he had a conversation with Albert on July 26,
1987 in which Albert said that he and Michael had committed the
murders and asked Brantley to contact the district attorney’s office
to make a deal on Albert’s behalf.
With this new jailhouse snitch testimony against Albert, as well
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as Janet’s testimony, the district attorney’s office took Albert to
trial. He was convicted of first degree murder on August 17, 1987,
and was subsequently sentenced to death. Albert filed two motions
for new trial, both of which were rejected by the trial court. He
then appealed his conviction and sentence to the Louisiana
3
Supreme Court, which unanimously rejected his claims. The
United States Supreme Court denied Albert’s petition for a writ of
4
certiorari. Having exhausted his direct appeal, Albert became
eligible for execution. This was the status of Albert’s case when we
began representing him in January of 1992.
IV. LINDQUIST & VENNUM TAKES ALBERT BURRELL’S CASE
I worked on a death penalty case as an associate at the law firm
of Shearman & Sterling in New York, and when I returned to
Minneapolis to practice law at Lindquist & Vennum, I wanted to
handle another one. As it turned out, Minnesota Advocates for
5
6
Human Rights sponsored a talk by Nick Trenticosta, a Louisiana
death penalty lawyer, in the fall of 1991. Nick came to Minnesota
to recruit attorneys from private law firms to handle post-conviction
7
death penalty cases on a pro bono basis. I spoke with a number of
3. State v. Burrell, 561 So. 2d 692 (La. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1074
(1991).
4. Burrell v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 1074 (1991).
5. At that time, Minnesota Advocates was known as Minnesota Lawyers
International Human Rights Committee.
6. I had met Nick once before, at a capital punishment conference in
Virginia in 1987. At that time he was doing death penalty work in Florida with the
Office of the Capital Collateral Representative. Nick is one of the most
accomplished and committed anti-death penalty lawyers in the country. He was
the executive director of the Loyola Death Penalty Resource Center, a community
federal defender organization for the State of Louisiana. After Congress cut off
funding for death penalty resource centers, Nick established, and continues to
run, the Center for Equal Justice in New Orleans.
7. I once asked a death penalty lawyer at the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
why he recruited commercial lawyers to handle post-conviction death penalty cases
since such lawyers are usually inexperienced in this challenging field. His
explanation was that commercial lawyers were capable and could learn what they
needed to know. More importantly, if they did not take these cases, death row
inmates would have no lawyers at post-conviction. It remains true today that there
is a glaring need for post-conviction representation—anti-death penalty advocates,
including groups within the American Bar Association, continue to turn to the
private bar in an attempt to fill this need. In fact, the need may be greater than
ever with the loss of federal funding for death penalty resource centers and
changes in federal habeas corpus laws that threaten to quicken the pace of
executions. At the same time, there is increasing evidence that a significant
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lawyers at Lindquist & Vennum about my interest in taking on a
death penalty case; several others expressed interest as well. We
met with Nick and decided that we would like to take a case from
him.
Our idea of taking a death penalty case still had to win
approval from our law firm. It would be a major commitment of
pro bono attorney time, and would likely entail substantial costs.
Tom Fabel, a highly respected partner at the firm, shepherded the
idea through the management committee, which approved it.
Lindquist & Vennum has a long and deep tradition of community
service. The firm’s willingness to take on the challenging task of
handling a post-conviction death penalty case was emblematic of
8
that tradition.
After considering a couple of cases, Nick decided to give us
Albert Burrell’s case. We, of course, had no idea what would
happen. Nick explained that Albert had completed his direct
appeal, and was in position to have a death warrant signed against
him. However, no one in the Union Parish District Attorney’s
Office seemed to be paying much attention to Albert’s case. Nick
thought that this was because the assistant district attorney who had
prosecuted Albert was no longer working out of Union Parish and
thus no one was keeping watch of the case in order to alert the trial
judge to set an execution date. Additionally, Nick said that he
thought there may even be some general feeling among Union
Parish officials that Albert was innocent. He had learned that the
assistant district attorney had apparently not wanted to try the case,
and in fact, had been surprised by the verdict and sentence. The
message that we got from Nick and his staff was clear—we should
begin investigating and evaluating Albert’s case but keep a low
profile and not stir things up, lest someone take notice and
proceed with a death warrant against Albert. The last thing anyone
wanted was a group of Minnesota lawyers coming to Louisiana and
causing a ruckus.
number of innocent people have been wrongfully convicted and/or sentenced to
death row, and undoubtedly some have been executed. See James S. Liebman, The
Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2053 (2000); Crystal Nix Hines,
Lack of Lawyers Hinders Appeals in Capital Cases, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2001, at A1.
8. In addition to Chuck Lloyd, Tom Fabel, and I, other Lindquist &
Vennum attorneys who worked on Albert’s case include Keith Ellison, Candee
Goodman, Helen Mary Hughesdon, Ann Kennedy, Joe Maternowski, Pete
Michaud, Reuben Mjaanes, Steve Quam, David Sasseville, Loren Thacker, and
Jessica Ware.
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With this caution in mind, we began reviewing the trial court
file, developing a social history and mental health history of Albert,
investigating multiple facts and issues, interviewing witnesses, and
developing our legal theories. At first, we focused on the
sentencing phase of Albert’s trial. Albert’s trial lawyers made no
investigation of Albert’s background and presented absolutely no
mitigating evidence to the jury to try to prevent the imposition of a
9
death sentence. We felt confident that because Albert’s significant
mental health problems had not been presented as mitigation
evidence at the sentencing phase of his trial, we could at least
obtain a re-sentencing. There did not seem to be any way that the
court could write off the failures of Albert’s lawyers as “trial
10
strategy.”
In many post-conviction death penalty cases, the fight revolves
around sentencing phase issues, and the defense lawyer’s goal is to
obtain a re-sentencing hearing. Our case was different. Albert
repeatedly and consistently expressed his innocence of the crimes.
Over and over again, in every conversation, Albert said, “I didn’t
have nothing to do with them two old people. I didn’t kill anyone.”
Moreover, our investigation began to show that the principal
witnesses against Albert at trial had no credibility and had
repeatedly lied for their own personal motives. Also, it became
clear that the prosecution and police presented false and highly
misleading evidence at trial, and failed to disclose a significant
amount of exculpatory evidence to defense counsel, in violation of
11
their obligations under Brady. Finally, the completely ineffective
9. In fact, Albert’s own lawyer falsely told the jury that there were no mental
health mitigating circumstances in Albert’s case. State of Louisiana v. Albert
Ronnie Burrell, Crim. Docket No. 28,734A (Third Judicial Dist. Ct., Union Parish,
La.) (Trial Record at 1794).
10. Our confidence was shaken along the way, however, by certain court
decisions, such as Williams v. Cain, 125 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1997). In the Williams
case, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court by holding that the failure to
present any mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of Williams’ capital trial
(despite his long history of mental health problems) was not ineffective assistance
of counsel. Id. at 276-80. The Court concluded that Williams was not prejudiced
by his lawyer’s actions, which the Court described as tactical and “quite arguably a
wise choice.” Id. at 279.
Dobie Gillis Williams was on death row at Angola with Albert. On January
8, 1999, Williams was executed. Sister Helen Prejean was Williams’ spiritual
advisor. Of Williams, Sister Prejean said, “For the first time, I believe I befriended
a truly innocent man on death row.” Lane Nelson, Death Watch: Dobie Gillis
Williams, THE ANGOLITE, vol. 24, no. 1, January/February 1999 at 10, 14.
11. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that the prosecution’s
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and incompetent performance of Albert’s trial lawyers effectively
12
denied him his right to counsel. In sum, the jury was not given all
of the facts and was purposely misled about certain important facts,
such that it was made to reach an incorrect verdict. Our job was
not merely to get a re-sentencing, but to win a new trial for Albert
13
and exonerate him.
V. ALBERT BURRELL’S UNTOLD STORY OF MENTAL RETARDATION
AND MENTAL ILLNESS
Over and above the evidence of Albert’s innocence and the
improper conduct of the police and prosecutors, Albert’s personal
condition cast a dark shadow over the fairness of every aspect of the
proceedings against him. Albert has a lifelong history of mental
retardation and mental illness that always significantly impaired his
functioning. That history, including the fact that Burrell had been
found incompetent in a prior court proceeding, was totally
ignored, and in fact, covered up by the prosecutor at the time of
Albert’s murder trial.
We came to know Albert as a gentle, confused soul who could
not comprehend what had happened to him. It was always very
difficult to communicate with Albert. He cannot speak nor think
clearly, and was incapable of helping himself with this ordeal.
Although he did not fully understand what was going on around
him, he always knew that he was innocent.
We learned that Albert’s significant mental impairments had
14
been apparent even at a very early age. In 1961, when Albert was
six, he entered first grade at the Calhoun Elementary School in
Choudrant, Louisiana. His teacher soon believed that Albert was
“severely retarded,” and because he was “such a problem,” asked

suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where evidence is material to guilt or punishment).
12. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (setting forth standard
for ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
13. Several times over the years we turned down offers to commute Albert’s
sentence to life imprisonment in exchange for giving up our efforts to obtain a
new trial. This was agonizing because if we had been wrong about the strength of
our case Albert would have been executed.
14. All of the reports, records, and documents discussed herein, including
the expert psychiatrist and psychologist reports, are on file in State of Louisiana v.
Albert Ronnie Burrell, Crim. Docket No. 28,734A (Third Judicial District Court,
Union Parish, Louisiana).
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Albert’s mother to keep him out of school, which she did. On
November 11, 1961, Burrell was evaluated for special education
classes by psychologist Tom C. Pennell and social worker Neil R.
Covington, who were both with the Northeast Special Education
Center in Monroe, Louisiana. Their report notes that:
Mrs. Burrell is convinced that Ronnie is a retarded child.
She attributes his retardation to factors incidental to his
birth, specifically, she believes she was given too much
anesthetic. She described Ronnie as not generally as alert
as her other children. When he failed to profit by the
school experiences thus far she is satisfied it is because he
cannot learn any better. She has a sister (now grown and
married) who is retarded and she feels Ronnie
demonstrates symptoms similar to her sister when she was
16
a child.
Albert was unable to complete any of the psychological tests
Dr. Pennell attempted to run, and in fact, was unable to
communicate with the evaluators at all. Dr. Pennell’s and Mr.
Covington’s preliminary conclusion was that Albert suffered from a
“mental deficiency.” They advised Mrs. Burrell that it would be in
Albert’s “best interest from an educational standpoint” to be in
special education classes, and even advised her to consider
“institutional placement.” Mrs. Burrell replied that her family was
too poor to be able to afford to move to a location where special
17
education classes were offered.
Mrs. Burrell kept her son out of school until the fall of 1962,
when he again returned to Calhoun Elementary for first grade.
Albert failed all of his classes and was institutionalized. Albert was
placed in the Cooley Hospital for Retarded Citizens, a year-round
facility, with very few services at that time. Albert apparently
resided at Cooley until approximately 1970.
His parents
occasionally visited him on the weekends. After leaving Cooley,
Albert briefly attended special education classes at Calhoun
Elementary School. In 1971, he left school at the age of 16. Albert
never learned how to read and write, and is still severely
intellectually impaired.
The jury in Albert’s capital trial heard nothing about his
institutionalization and the early evidence of his mental retardation
15.
16.
17.

Northeast Special Education Center Evaluation Report at 1.
Id.
Id. at 2.
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and severe impairment. The jury also did not hear that eleven
years before the murder trial, in neighboring Lincoln Parish, Judge
Fred W. Jones found that Albert “does not have the mental capacity
to proceed” on arson charges against him, and accordingly
committed Albert to the Central Louisiana State Mental Hospital
18
“for custody, care and treatment.” Judge Jones’ determination
that Albert was mentally incompetent was based on reports from a
court-appointed Sanity Commission and from Dr. Paul B. Ware, a
psychiatrist from Shreveport. The July 11, 1976 report of Dr. Ware
concluded:
The patient’s intelligence is extremely limited. . . .
Clinically, I would estimate his I.Q. to be between 50-60.
His overall judgment and comprehension is extremely
limited. He talked openly about both his visual and
auditory hallucinations. When left alone, he continues to
look around and is probably at present continuing to have
19
some hallucinatory activity.
Dr. Ware diagnosed Albert as suffering from mental
retardation and schizophrenia. He concluded that Albert was
psychotic and incompetent to stand trial. Dr. Ware stated:
I certainly do not feel the patient is able to assist in his
defense at this time. He remains psychotic and is
recovering from an overt psychotic episode. . . . I
question his ability to assist in his defense even when he is
not psychotic. His extremely limited intelligence and
limited comprehension makes it difficult for him to
20
evaluate what is going on around him.
Although Albert was released from the state hospital in August
of 1976, there was never a judicial determination that he had been
restored to competency. Albert was never prosecuted on the arson
21
charges and they were dismissed on August 10, 1982.
Astoundingly, no evidence concerning Albert’s mental
retardation, his mental illness or the prior determination that he
was incompetent, was presented at his murder trial—not one word.

18. State of Louisiana v. Ronnie Burrell, Court File No. 24043 (Third Judicial
Dist. Ct., Lincoln Parish, La. July 15, 1976) (Order of Commitment).
19. Report of Dr. Paul B. Ware 2 (July 15, 1976) (filed in Third Judicial
District Court, Lincoln Parish, La. in Criminal Suit No. 24043).
20. Id. at 2-3.
21. State of Louisiana v. Thomas Burrell and Ronnie Burrell, Court File No.
24043 (Third Judicial Dist. Ct., Lincoln Parish, La. August 10, 1982) (Release
Order and Dismissal of Prosecution).
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The prosecutor knew of Albert’s incompetence for at least two
reasons: (1) he personally signed the release order and dismissal of
prosecution in the arson proceeding against Albert, and (2) he
obtained certified copies of the prior incompetency adjudication
from the clerk of court just before Albert’s murder trial. Yet, he
said nothing to the court about the issue so that the court could
undertake a competency determination. The prosecution had a
22
duty to raise that issue but remained silent.
Moreover, the
prosecutor affirmatively misled the court and the jury by stating
that he had “seen no evidence of mental disease or defect” in
23
Albert. As the prior dismissal order and the certified copies from
his files showed, that was a lie. Albert could not, consistent with
due process, have been put on trial while incompetent to assist in
his own defense or unable to understand the proceedings against
24
him.
It was a violation of due process for the prosecutor to mislead
the court and the jury concerning Albert’s competence, and to fail
to raise the issue so that a competency determination could have
been made.
The United States Supreme Court has long
recognized that proceeding to try a defendant who is incompetent
and therefore unable to assist in his own defense is a due process
25
violation and requires a new trial. Specifically, the Court wrote:
It has long been accepted that a person whose mental
condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand
the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to
consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his
defense may not be subjected to a trial . . . [T]he
prohibition is fundamental to an adversary system of
26
justice.
On this ground alone, Albert was entitled to a new trial.
We arranged to have Albert examined by a psychologist and a
psychiatrist and both concluded that, given Albert’s history of
mental retardation and mental illness dating back to early
childhood, he was not competent at the time of his trial. Dr. Eric S.
22. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 642 (West 1997) (stating defendant’s
mental capacity to proceed may be raised at any time by the defense, the district
attorney, or the court).
23. State of Louisiana v. Albert Ronnie Burrell, Crim. Docket No. 28,734A (Third
Judicial Dist. Ct., Union Parish, La.) (Trial Record at 1800).
24. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-73 (1975).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 171-72. See also Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1966).
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Engum, a forensic psychologist, conducted a clinical interview and
formal psychological evaluation of Albert, which included extensive
psychological testing. Dr. Engum summarized his opinions about
Albert as follows:
It is more likely than not that Mr. Burrell was incompetent
to stand trial in 1987. . . . Mr. Burrell suffers from
multiple psychological/psychiatric disabilities which
substantially impair his functioning and his ability to
relate to those around him. In this examiner’s opinion,
Mr. Burrell suffers from psychosis emanating from
chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia, mild mental
retardation, underlying organic brain damage, and severe
academic deficiencies. Moreover, a review of Mr. Burrell’s
past academic and mental health records and of this
examiner’s previous psychological evaluation of Mr.
Burrell, reveals that Mr. Burrell has suffered from severe
and consistent mental health problems for most, if not all,
of his life. Based upon comprehensive psychological and
neuropsychological assessment, it is this examiner’s
opinion that Mr. Burrell: 1) is unable to consult effectively
and meaningfully with counsel; 2) lacks the capacity to
understand fully the proceedings against him; and 3) is
therefore incompetent to stand trial. Furthermore, it is
this examiner’s opinion within a reasonable degree of
psychological certainty that Mr. Burrell suffered from
chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia, mild mental
retardation, organic brain damage, and severe academic
deficiencies at the time of the original trial proceedings
27
from 1986 through 1987.
Dr. Sarah DeLand, a psychiatrist (and the former director of
competency restoration at the state hospital in Jackson, Louisiana),
also examined Albert twice and reached conclusions similar to Dr.
Engum.
Dr. DeLand diagnosed Albert as suffering from
undifferentiated schizophrenia, mild mental retardation, a
cognitive disorder and a phonological disorder. Dr. DeLand also
found that Albert was not competent. Her conclusion was:
It is also my opinion, with reasonable medical certainty,
that Mr. Burrell does not meet the Bennett Criteria and is
therefore not competent to proceed, for the reasons
outlined above. Further, I am in agreement with Dr.
Engum, that the long history and chronicity of these
27.

Report of Dr. Eric S. Engum at 2-3 (Aug. 25, 1997).
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disorders make it very unlikely that Mr. Burrell was ever
competent to proceed. This opinion is based upon the
documentation that Mr. Burrell had significant
intellectual limitations from a very young age. His need
for special education was recognized in the first grade,
and he attended special schools for mentally retarded
individuals. In 1976, he was found to be not competent to
proceed because of psychosis and moderate mental
retardation.
Psychological testing has consistently
confirmed intellectual limitations.
While psychotic
symptoms can wax and wane, mental retardation does not.
It is my opinion, with reasonable medical certainty, that
even if Mr. Burrell’s psychotic symptoms were under
control at the time of his original charges, his significant
mental retardation, alone, would render him incompetent
28
to proceed.
Both Dr. DeLand and Dr. Engum concluded that Albert’s
mental retardation and mental illness rendered him unable to
work effectively and meaningfully with his attorneys. Albert could
not communicate relevant information to his attorneys, evaluate his
attorneys’ advice or make rational and appropriate decisions
regarding the exercise of his legal rights. Albert’s thinking was so
disorganized and confused that he could not aid his attorneys in
examining witnesses, listen to or understand the testimony of
potential witnesses, or inform his attorneys of any distortions or
misstatements of witnesses or the prosecutor. Albert was on trial
for murder, facing the death penalty, and because of his mental
retardation and mental illness, was incapable of providing his
attorneys with any meaningful or useful information to assist in his
defense. Albert was unable even to inform his attorneys of his
mental retardation and mental illness, and the prior judicial
determination that he was incompetent, thus allowing the
prosecutor’s lies about Albert’s mental health to go unchallenged.
VI. THE WRONGFUL CONVICTION OF ALBERT BURRELL
The evidence against Albert presented by the State was
extraordinarily weak by any measure. A conviction was possible
only because the credibility of the witnesses against Albert (i.e., his
ex-wife Janet Burrell, the St. Clairs/Amy Opal, and Olan Wayne
Brantley) was incompetently challenged at trial. Our investigation
28.

Report of Dr. Sarah DeLand at 5 (Feb. 13, 1998).
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uncovered new evidence that clearly established the absolute
unreliability of all these witnesses, and proved Albert’s innocence.
This new evidence included credible statements by both Janet
Burrell and Amy Opal that they had lied at trial, inconsistent prior
statements by the St. Clairs and Ms. Opal that the police and
prosecution failed to disclose, and exculpatory police investigative
reports that were not disclosed. It also included evidence of
Brantley’s serious mental illness, his documented propensity for
telling incredible “fantastic stories,” and evidence of the plea
bargain he received for testifying.
A. Dan Grady’s Affidavit
Early in our investigation we spoke with Dan Grady, the
assistant district attorney who prosecuted both Albert and Michael.
He eventually gave us an affidavit in which he disclosed that he
recommended against even presenting the cases to the grand jury
in 1986 because:
The evidence at that time, in my opinion, was too weak
and too dependent upon witnesses of questionable
credibility to support a prosecution. This assessment was
reflected in my case evaluation memorandum to the
district attorney. Notwithstanding my advice, the district
attorney directed me to present the cases to the grand jury
29
and to try them to avoid embarrassment to the sheriff.
Grady then provided his explanation of the potential
“embarrassment to the sheriff” resulting from a case in which no
arrests were made for over six weeks following the killings:
I believe that the Union Parish Sheriff was under
substantial pressure at the time the charging decision
against Graham and Burrell was being made, in part
because he had refused FBI assistance for the
investigation of the case, and in part because the local
press and public were anxious for action on a double
30
homicide which occurred six weeks before any arrests.
Grady did not mention an additional factor that may have
been weighing heavily upon Sheriff Averitt in October of 1986. We
learned that during this time, Averitt engaged in conduct which
ultimately resulted in a federal indictment alleging that he
29.
Aff.].
30.

Affidavit of Dan J. Grady, III at ¶ 4 (April 17, 1995) [hereinafter Grady
Id. at ¶ 5.
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conspired to defraud Union Parish and a plea of guilty to mail
31
fraud.
Grady’s disclosures of improper motivation for the prosecution
of Albert were significant for many reasons. First, the information
revealed a law enforcement climate in which the pursuit of truth
apparently had taken a back seat to the protection of a sheriff’s
reputation. This fact took on added significance in light of Janet
Burrell’s assertion that her trial testimony was the product of
coercion by the sheriff’s office, along with corroborating new
evidence that improper coercion had often been employed by the
sheriff’s office. Second, the affidavit from Grady revealed that the
prosecution was well aware of, in Grady’s words, the “questionable
credibility” of its key witnesses soon after Janet Burrell and the St.
32
Clair/Opal evidence first came to light.
Finally, Grady’s affidavit raised profound additional questions
about the jailhouse confessions reported by Olan Wayne Brantley.
It deserves note that Brantley’s first report of a confession in this
case came only three days after the grand jury indictment—that is,
after Grady expressed his opinion that the cases should not be
charged, because the evidence which existed at that time was
33
simply too weak. Was it a mere happy coincidence for Sheriff
Averitt that a mentally ill prisoner emerged from his jail with the
tale of a confession at just that time? Coincidence or not, the
Brantley testimony was viewed by prosecutor Grady as having
34
“played a major role in both convictions.”
B. The Completely Unreliable Trial Testimony of Janet Burrell
As previously noted, Janet Burrell was one of the primary
reasons why Albert was convicted. Her story of meeting Albert on
the night of the murders and finding Delton Frost’s wallet, first
shared with the police six weeks after the Frost murders, was the
linchpin of the prosecution’s case.
Janet Burrell’s testimony apparently was accepted by the jury
despite the evidence that a wallet containing Delton Frost’s driver’s
license, social security card, some papers, and six one dollar bills
was found by police at the Frosts’ home at the time the bodies were

31.
32.
33.
34.

See United States v. Hatch and Averitt, 926 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1991).
Grady Aff. at ¶ 4.
Id. at ¶¶ 4-6.
Id. at ¶ 7.
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discovered. The wallet and its contents (minus the six one dollar
bills) were introduced at Albert’s trial. The wallet, however, was a
different color than the one described by Janet and was found on
the Frosts’ bed under the contents of some paper sacks which had
been dumped out on the bed. The jury was told only that the
wallet was found at the scene, which the State attempted to explain
by theorizing that Burrell returned to the scene after meeting with
Janet and tossed the wallet through an open window and onto the
bed. The actual location of the wallet, described in an investigation
report prepared by Deputy Elmer Hearron, but not disclosed by
the prosecution in discovery, was never presented to the jury.
Moreover, when Deputy Monty Forbess was asked on crossexamination whether his notes reflected the location of the wallet
when found on the bed, he responded that they did not. The
prosecution allowed this misleading testimony to be presented,
knowing that the undisclosed report of Deputy Hearron describing
the wallet’s location contradicted the State’s theory.
If this undisclosed evidence, as well as the available
impeachment evidence had been introduced, no reasonable juror
would ever have believed the testimony of Janet Burrell. As it
35
happened, Albert’s defense lawyer was so incompetent that he was
able to introduce only a small amount of the impeaching evidence.
For example, he failed to lay the proper foundation and failed to
ask the right questions, thereby precluding the jury from hearing
about Janet’s reputation for being untruthful. Similarly, he failed
to lay the proper foundation to impeach James Burrell, Janet’s
second husband, regarding Janet’s whereabouts on the night of the
Frost murders. Even worse was his failure to contrast Janet’s trial
account of Albert’s supposed description of the Frost shootings
with her grand jury testimony, where she reported that Albert told
her nothing about the killings.
Considering these problems with Janet’s trial testimony, it is
not surprising that shortly after the trial she recanted her
testimony, saying that she had lied to get her ex-husband in trouble
so that she could gain custody of their child. When asked to repeat

35. Albert’s defense lawyer, Keith Mullins, was convicted of narcotics offenses
in 1993, which led to his disbarment from the practice of law in the State of
Louisiana. See In Re J. Keith Mullins, 655 So. 2d 323 (La. 1995). Defense cocounsel Roderick Gibson was also disbarred. Mr. Gibson’s disbarment was based
upon numerous instances of dishonesty, fraud and deceit. See In Re Roderick P.
Gibson, 639 So. 2d 212 (La. 1994).
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the recantation at a motion for a new trial, however, Janet refused
and again adopted her trial account.
While such flip-flopping does little to instill confidence in
anything said by a witness, Janet Burrell provided us with an
account which explained her conduct. In an affidavit, Janet said:
5. Several weeks after the murders of Delton and Callie
Frost, I contacted the Union Parish Sheriff’s office to tell
them that on the night the Frosts were killed, I had seen
my ex-husband, Albert Ronnie Burrell, with a lot of
money and a wallet that belonged to Mr. Frost. I said this
because I wanted to get my ex-husband in trouble with the
police so that I could get my son back into my custody.
6. What I told the police was not true. I did not see
Albert Ronnie Burrell at all on the night that the Frosts
were killed. I never did see him with Mr. Frost’s wallet
and I did not see him with a lot of money on the night the
Frost’s [sic] were killed. At the time I told the police that
I had seen those things, I believed that the police would
ask Albert Ronnie Burrell questions about what I had told
them but I did not believe that they would accuse him of
murder.
7. After I first told the police about the wallet and the
money, when I found out that Albert Ronnie Burrell was
in a lot of trouble for what I had said, I tried to tell the
police that what I said was not true. When I told the
sheriff’s deputies that what I said was not true, they
threatened me. They told me if I had provided them
information that was not true and changed my story, they
could take my son away from me forever and put me in
jail. They told me these things a lot as the trials of
Michael Graham and Albert Ronnie Burrell got closer.
The deputies scared me. As a result, I believed I had to
continue to lie in order to try to get my son back. That is
why I told the lies that I did at the trials of Michael
36
Graham and Albert Ronnie Burrell.
Janet’s recantation was matched by a recantation from her
husband, James Burrell. James concurred in the truthfulness of
Janet’s affidavit and said the following:
4. On the night that the Frosts were killed, my wife Janet
was with me the entire evening. She did not leave at any
time that night to go and meet with my brother Albert
36.

Affidavit of Janet Burrell at ¶¶ 5-7 (March 16, 1998).
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Ronnie Burrell.
5. I did not tell the truth at the time I testified at trial
because of the threats that had been made to my wife by
37
the sheriff’s deputies.
Adding significant weight to these recantations by Janet and
James Burrell was new evidence provided by George Cothran, a
former chief of the Farmerville Police Department. In an affidavit
given to Michael Graham’s lawyer, Mr. Cothran testified that Monty
Forbess, a deputy with the Union Parish Sheriff’s office who worked
on Albert’s and Michael’s cases, “had an established practice of
threatening to have the children of female witnesses taken away
from them when the female witnesses would not provide the
38
testimony he sought.”
C. “Lying” Wayne Brantley
The second component of the prosecution’s case against
Albert and Michael was the testimony of Olan Wayne Brantley.
Brantley was a prisoner in the Union Parish jail who came forward,
following prosecutor Dan Grady’s recommendation that the cases
were too weak to support prosecution, with a supposed jailhouse
“confession” from Michael Graham.
Following Graham’s
conviction, Brantley emerged with another alleged jailhouse
“confession,” this time from Albert. Grady viewed Brantley a
“credible witness” and believed that Brantley’s “testimony played a
39
major role in both convictions.”
Our investigation, and the investigation by Graham’s lawyers,
uncovered substantial new evidence about Brantley’s mental illness,
his prior adjudications of incompetency and insanity, his
undisclosed plea agreements, and his propensity for receiving
“confessions.” We learned that Brantley was a seriously ill man who
suffered from delusions, had a grandiosity complex, and had
significant difficulty distinguishing truth from falsity.
Since at least 1979, Brantley has repeatedly been in trouble for
40
passing bad checks. On February 19, 1981—five and a half years
before the confession stories in Albert’s and Michael’s cases—
Brantley was found not guilty of criminal charges in Ouachita
37.
38.
39.
40.

Affidavit of James P. Burrell at ¶¶ 4-5 (March 16, 1998).
Affidavit of George Cothran at ¶ 4 (August 11, 1997).
Grady Aff. at ¶¶ 6-7.
See State v. Brantley, 514 So. 2d 747, 748 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1987)
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Parish for issuing a worthless check by reason of insanity and was
ordered by the court to be committed to the Central Louisiana
State Hospital.
Notwithstanding the hospital’s decision to
discharge Brantley in April of that year, the court apparently
ordered that Brantley continue to be confined. He was ultimately
discharged on July 27, 1981. In November, 1982, Brantley was
found incompetent to proceed on criminal charges then pending
and was again committed by the Ouachita Parish District Court to
the state hospital. Records from the court file demonstrate that
Brantley had been hospitalized repeatedly beginning in 1979 at
Louisiana State University Medical Center, Brentwood Hospital and
41
Central Louisiana State Hospital.
In 1986, Brantley was in trouble for writing worthless checks in
Morehouse Parish, and again raised an insanity defense. This time
Brantley was not found insane, but he did present witnesses who
testified that during his hyperactive phases, “he was talkative,
42
‘fractious,’ and able to tell fantastic stories.”
Although Brantley testified on direct examination during
Albert’s trial that he was taking medication, the full extent of his
mental illness and his various hospitalizations was never presented
to the jury; nor was the jury told that Brantley had claimed to be
insane shortly before he supposedly heard the confessions which
put him at the center of this case. Unfortunately, the jury also
never was told that Brantley himself claimed, through witnesses,
that he was able to tell fantastic stories. The State never disclosed
to the defense information it had concerning the true nature of
Brantley’s mental status, which was highly exculpatory because
“[t]he jury’s estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given
43
witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence. . . .” If
the jury had been given all of the information concerning
Brantley’s mental status, the credibility of his testimony would have
been completely undermined.
Moreover, the State presented false and highly misleading
evidence when it allowed Brantley to testify that he could not have
received any deals in exchange for his testimony against Michael
and Albert. In fact, Brantley was originally charged in Union
Parish with two counts of forgery, which carried a maximum

41.
42.
43.

Id. at 748-50.
Id. at 749.
See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).
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sentence of ten years. On January 9, 1987, after Brantley came
forward with Michael’s alleged confession, but before Michael’s
trial, the district attorney’s office reduced the charges against
Brantley to two counts of issuing worthless checks of less than $500,
which carried a maximum sentence of not more than two years. In
addition, Brantley’s Union Parish sentence ran concurrently with a
45
six year no parole sentence he had received in Morehouse Parish.
The State failed to correct the record and inform the jury that the
Union Parish charges against Brantley were reduced after he came
forward with his alleged evidence, that Brantley would not serve
(and did not serve) any additional time for pleading guilty to the
Union Parish charges, and that Brantley had other convictions in
other parishes for which he would not serve one day more in jail.
The State’s presentation of this false and highly misleading
evidence in and of itself warranted a new trial.
In addition, we discovered that Brantley has shown a bizarre
and unbelievable pattern of claiming that capital murder
defendants confess to him when he gets into legal trouble in an
attempt to plead his way out. Since Albert’s and Michael’s trials,
Brantley, incredibly, has claimed that two other capital murder
defendants in two separate capital murder cases in Florida
confessed to him. In Fort Lauderdale, Florida, Brantley, going by
the name of Terry Manning, claimed that one Jesse Adams
confessed guilt to him concerning a murder charge. In a
46
deposition given in that matter, Brantley wove a remarkable tale
in which he claimed to be working for the Gambino organized
crime family and that he was friends with now jailed mobster John
Gotti. He also claimed that former Louisiana Governor Edwin
Edwards’ attorney, Camille Gravel, was his lawyer.
In 1996, Brantley was jailed in Jacksonville, Florida, using the
alias J. D. Gaylord and claiming to be a member of the Gaylord
family, the family that owns the Grand Ole Opry in Nashville,
Tennessee. Brantley was arrested for writing bad checks and
attempting to run a scam in which he tried to convince a
Jacksonville law firm to write him a check out of its client trust

44. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:72 (West 1997).
45. Brantley sentenced to six years on felony count and six months on
misdemeanor count, to run concurrently; Brantley could have been sentenced to
ten years.
46. See State of Florida v. Jessie Adams, No. 92-17125CF10B (Fort Lauderdale,
Broward County, Florida (1994)).
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account for $800,000. While in jail, Brantley again claimed that
another capital murder defendant had confessed to him—and
again no one else was privy to the confession. At a deposition in
47
that case, Brantley was asked about Albert’s and Michael’s cases,
and testified that Albert and Michael had confessed to him at the
same time while the three of them were standing around the
courthouse, that others were present, and that Albert was not
incarcerated at the time. Obviously, this sworn testimony differed
in all material respects from the sworn testimony Brantley gave at
Albert’s and Michael’s trials.
According to reports of Brantley’s activities in Jacksonville, he
was claiming that he was a country western music promoter; that he
owned a Jaguar automobile; that among his attorneys was F. Lee
Bailey; that he was dating singer Tanya Tucker; that his sister was a
member of the United States House of Representatives; that he
owned a record company; that he was a member of the Gambino
crime family; and that his family owned the San Antonio Spurs of
the National Basketball Association and the Houston Oilers of the
48
National Football League.
Clearly, Brantley has a propensity for telling “fantastic stories.”
Indeed, at the hearing on Michael Graham’s motion for a new trial,
the current sheriff of Union Parish testified that Olan Wayne
Brantley is referred to in the community as “Lying” Wayne
49
Brantley. Nevertheless, Brantley was the prosecution’s star witness
against both Albert and Michael.
D. Undisclosed Prior Inconsistent Statements of the St. Clairs and Amy
Opal, and Opal’s Recantation
The third part of the case against Albert was the testimony of
five people who put Albert at the home of the St. Clair family,
along with Michael Graham, on the night of the Frost murders.
Some said the men had a suitcase with money and that Michael
Graham had blood on him. The witnesses were four members of

47. See State of Florida v. David Hadaway, No. 94004207CFA (Duval County,
Florida (1996)).
48. Id. (see investigative reports).
49. State of Louisiana v. Michael Ray Graham, Jr., Crim. Docket No. 28,734B
at p. 24, n.1 (Third Judicial Dist. Ct., Union Parish, La. March 3, 2000). A retired
Union Parish jailer recently said with respect to Brantley: “If his lips moved, he was
lying.” Christopher Baughman and Tom Guarisco, Justice for None, BATON ROUGE
ADVOCATE, March 18, 2001, at 1A (first article in a three-part series).
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the St. Clair family and Amy Opal, a teenage friend of the St. Clair
daughter. Kenneth St. Clair had been a suspect in the Frost case
prior to the arrest of Albert and Michael.
In our investigation we discovered pretrial statements made by
the St. Clairs that the prosecution failed to disclose to Albert’s and
Michael’s defense lawyers. These statements differed significantly
from the St. Clairs’ testimony at trial, and thus could have been
used for impeachment purposes. For example, in one of the
statements the St. Clairs said that Albert and Michael were at their
home on Saturday night, August 30. They said they were sure it was
Saturday night because they were watching wrestling, which was
only televised on Saturdays. The murders, however, happened on
Sunday night, August 31. The pretrial statements also differed
from trial testimony on other critical factors, such as the amount of
money Albert allegedly had and whether Michael had blood on
him.
In addition, Amy Opal (now named Hutto) gave an affidavit to
Michael’s lawyer in which she recanted her trial testimony. In her
affidavit, Ms. Hutto said that the St. Clairs influenced her
testimony. Ms. Hutto said that Jackie St. Clair told her, “say this, say
50
that. Don’t tell about my brother.” In the affidavit, Ms. Hutto
further stated that it was Kenneth St. Clair who she saw with blood
51
on him. She also said that she kept this information to herself all
52
these years because she was, and still is, afraid of the St. Clairs.
VII. A DEATH WARRANT IS SIGNED AGAINST ALBERT
In June of 1996, the unthinkable happened. Judge James
Dozier, who had presided at Albert’s trial, signed a death warrant
against Albert. The death warrant was a two page document
formally entitled: “Warrant for Execution of Person Condemned to
Die.” Written in cold legalese, it sketched out the fact that Albert
had been convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death.
Its ultimate paragraph read as follows:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, James M. Dozier, Jr., Judge of the
Third Judicial District Court, being the Court of original
jurisdiction, and in accordance with La. R. S. 15:567, do
hereby direct and command you to cause the execution of
50.
51.
52.

Affidavit of Amy Hutto at ¶ 3 (October 18, 1996).
Id. at ¶ 4.
Id. at ¶ 5.
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ALBERT RONNIE BURRELL, the condemned in this
case, in the manner provided by law. You shall cause the
condemned, ALBERT RONNIE BURRELL, to be put to
death on August 29, 1996, between the hours of 12:00
Midnight and 3:00 o’clock A.M., and you shall follow all of
the requirements and requisites of the law in carrying out
53
this execution.
This was an absolutely stunning and frightening turn in the
case. Albert’s death warrant meant that our careful investigation
had to come to an end. Instead, we were forced to put the
information we had gathered to use immediately in an effort to
obtain a stay of execution. Rather than filing a standard stay brief,
we decided to prepare more thorough papers showing that Albert
had not received a fair trial and was innocent of the crimes of
which he was convicted. In addition to asking for a stay, we
decided to ask for investigative funds and expert witness funds.
The expert funds would provide, among other things, for a
psychologist and psychiatrist to develop evidence pertaining to
Albert’s competency and a legal expert to opine on defense
counsel’s total failure to meet the minimum level of practice
expected of attorneys in Louisiana in a capital murder trial. We
never learned why a death warrant was signed at that time,
although it seemed more than just coincidence that Judge Dozier
was up for re-election in the fall.
After submitting our papers, we were able to obtain a stay
seventeen days before Albert’s scheduled execution in a telephone
conference with Judge Dozier. We suggested that perhaps he
would prefer not to hear our motion for funds until after his reelection. He readily agreed.
VIII. THE MOTION FOR FUNDS
A. Judge Woodard is Elected
What happened next was the first real bit of luck, or perhaps
grace if you choose to think of it that way, that happened for Albert
in this ordeal. We were led to believe that Judge Dozier would
handily win re-election. He was a fixture in Union Parish, having
53. State of Louisiana v. Albert Ronnie Burrell, Crim. Docket No. 28,734A at
2 (Third Judicial Dist. Ct., Union Parish, La. June 17, 1996).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2001

23

03_FINAL.PINCUS 08.29.01.DOC

50

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 6
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

9/7/2001 3:34 PM

[Vol. 28:1

served on the bench for many years. His opponent was Cynthia
Woodard, a lawyer from neighboring Lincoln Parish. There are
courthouses in both Union Parish and Lincoln Parish and the
judgeship covers both of them. We had talked to a number of
people who said that all they saw were campaign signs for Judge
Dozier and they did not think that Ms. Woodard had much of a
presence in the campaign. We did not realize that our intelligence
was coming from Union Parish and that Ms. Woodard’s strength
was largely in Lincoln Parish. As it turned out, Ms. Woodard won
the election.
B. Hearing on Our Motion for Funds
After Judge Woodard’s election, we arranged for our motion
for funds to be heard in March of 1997. Chuck and I traveled to
Farmerville not knowing what to expect from the new judge. We
had not asked for specific dollar amounts in our motion papers, so
we sat in our hotel room the night before and brainstormed. We
decided on a figure of $12,500, but realized that it was in all
likelihood an exercise in fantasy. Nick had told us that the state
trial judges rarely awarded funds at post-conviction in capital cases.
He said that he thought $500 was the most anyone had received,
and that we could likely get more by taking a writ to the Louisiana
Supreme Court, but even then the amount would be limited to a
few thousand dollars.
We showed up for court and were met by a judge who was
bright, courteous, and clearly interested in our case. Judge
Woodard allowed us to take nearly an hour to present our motion
as Chuck and I alternated arguing parts of the case. During our
argument, Judge Woodard took copious notes and asked an
occasional thoughtful question. We were opposed by Assistant
District Attorney Shawn Alford. It may have been my imagination,
but it seemed that Ms. Alford was taken aback by Judge Woodard’s
approach, perhaps being more used to Judge Dozier’s style which I
assumed was far less accommodating to defense lawyers. A local
lawyer confirmed as much, when he said that Judge Dozier
“probably would not have given [us] the time of day” and would
have denied our motion from the bench. Judge Woodard took our
motion under advisement.
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C. Albert’s Courthouse Visit with His Mother
We had arranged to have Albert transported from Angola to
the courthouse in Farmerville for the hearing, as was his right. He
left the prison that morning escorted by several guards. Albert was
dressed in a prison jumpsuit and shackled with leg irons and
handcuffs attached to a chain around his waist. Albert’s mother
came to the hearing along with his sister Estell and several other
family members. Prior to the hearing we asked the guards if Albert
might be able to spend some time with his mother. The guards
said that perhaps he could, if he behaved himself during the
hearing. Albert sat by my side at counsel table with his head
bowed, rocking slightly throughout the hearing. He seemed to
listen, but clearly understood little of what was going on. After the
hearing, the guards were satisfied and let Albert sit with his mother
in the jury room adjacent to the courtroom. Of course he was
supervised and chained at all times. Nevertheless, Albert’s mother
got to touch him and hold him and be with him outside of prison
walls for the first time in almost ten years. There were tears all
around. I wanted to take a picture, but the guards would not
permit it.
We returned to Minnesota the next day to await Judge
Woodard’s ruling. Four days later we received a telephone call and
learned that Gladys Burrell, Albert’s mother, had suffered a heart
attack during the night and passed away. Albert had lost the one
person who had loved and supported him, and indeed cared for
him for his entire life. I was grateful that, at the very least, we had
been able to give Albert and his mother a brief period of time
together outside of the prison prior to Mrs. Burrell’s death.
D. Judge Woodard Grants Our Motion for Funds
On July 8, 1997, Judge Woodard granted our motion for funds
to assist Albert in the preparation of his petition for post-conviction
relief. Judge Woodard stated that we had made a compelling case
and that the relief we requested was justified and required under
existing federal and state law. She then proceeded to grant us
every dollar we asked for: $12,500. Our understanding is that this
was the largest sum ever awarded for experts in a case involving a
claim for post-conviction relief in the history of the State of
Louisiana.
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IX. MICHAEL GRAHAM’S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
A. Negotiations Fail—The Hearing on Michael’s Motion
Throughout our representation of Albert, we worked very
closely with Michael Graham’s lawyer, John Holdridge. John had
given up a career at a Wall Street law firm to work full-time on
capital cases in Louisiana and Mississippi. He is a brilliant,
crusading capital defense lawyer. We shared the information and
materials that we had obtained with John, which he used, along
with the results of his own investigation, to prepare an amended
motion for new trial for Michael. John’s motion papers skillfully
laid out the constitutional errors committed by the police and
prosecution in Michael’s case, and compellingly argued that
Michael was entitled to a new trial. Despite having been tried in
1987, Michael’s case was still on direct appeal, and his initial
motion for new trial had never been heard. That hearing was
finally scheduled for March, 1998.
Chuck and I traveled to Farmerville to appear at the hearing.
It was preceded by a lengthy conference between Judge Woodard
and all the lawyers that were involved. By this time, the Union
Parish District Attorney’s Office had bowed out of both cases and
passed them on to the Louisiana Attorney General’s Office.
Apparently, after hearing our presentation of Albert’s case in
connection with the funds motion, the District Attorney’s Office
wanted nothing to do with these cases. Serious negotiations took
place that day to attempt to resolve Michael’s case. In addition, the
lawyers from the Attorney General’s Office acknowledged that
Albert’s case was virtually the same as Michael’s case and indicated
that they would treat it the same way. In the end, however, no
agreement was reached.
As we learned throughout our
54
experience, death penalty cases in Louisiana are highly political
and the Attorney General’s Office was unwilling on this day to
agree to any relief for Michael and Albert. Instead, it wanted Judge
54. Denise LeBoeuf, who was recently appointed to head a new Louisiana
capital defense agency, has said, “Capital cases are so political that winning
becomes far more important for the average D.A. We’re not talking about being
competitive. We’re talking about winning at all costs. Deliberately deceiving the
court. Withholding favorable evidence. Arguing things they know aren’t true.
Harassing defense witnesses. Concealing deals they make with their witnesses.
Winning means getting a death sentence. They are out to win.” Dead Teen
Walking, TIME MAGAZINE, Jan. 19, 1998.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol28/iss1/6

26

03_FINAL.PINCUS 08.29.01.DOC

2001]

9/7/2001 3:34 PM

Pincus: "It's Good To Be Free"?: An Essay about the Exoneration of Albert
“IT’S GOOD TO BE FREE”

53

Woodard to rule on Michael’s motion.
B. Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola
During this trip to Louisiana, we also visited Albert at Angola.
If you think of Louisiana as shaped like an “L,” Angola is located in
the elbow of the L. It is fifty-nine miles northwest of Baton Rouge.
Angola does not resemble a prison as we ordinarily think of one in
that it is not simply a secure, walled building. Instead, it consists of
18,000 acres of what is often described as “the finest farmland in
the south.” Angola is located in a rural area surrounded on three
sides by the Mississippi River and on the fourth side by the rugged,
almost jungle-like, Tunica Hills. It is an old slave plantation. Some
people refer to the prison, which bears the initials L.S.P., as the
“last slave plantation.”
There are six separate fenced areas at Angola; the remaining
acreage is a large farm, whose primary crops are corn and soybeans.
There are approximately 5,100 inmates at Angola, and over 1,500
correctional officers are employed to supervise and maintain
control and custody of them. Many of the general custody inmates
are put to work tending and harvesting the crops. Death row
inmates, such as Albert, are housed in a small cinder block building
not far from the prison’s front entrance, which is enclosed by two
high chain-link fences that are topped with razor wire. The
building is known as the Reception Center or “RC,” and, except for
a brief period, it has been the site of Louisiana’s death row since
55
1957.
We visited with Albert in an area termed the “bullpen,” which
was reserved for attorney-client visits. We explained what was going
on in his case and discussed Michael’s motion for a new trial. After
our meeting, I decided to ask the guards if we could see Albert’s
cell. I knew that this was an unusual request that would most likely
be refused, but thought that if I was polite enough, and acted
naive, perhaps the guards would allow it. As I suspected, my
request was met with some amusement. The guard who was with us
said that his supervisor was nearby and he would ask. He
55. In the spring of 1998, death row inmates were moved to cells in the Main
Prison Extended Lockdown, a building approximately a mile and a half inside the
prison grounds. In early 1999, however, they were moved back to the RC. See
Wilbert Rideau, Switching Places, THE ANGOLITE, vol. 23, no. 4, July/August 1998 at
14; Vicki Ferstel, 3 More Angola Officers on Leave After Escape, BATON ROUGE
ADVOCATE, November 10, 1999, at 18C.
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proceeded to shout through the bars to an adjacent part of the
building: “These lawyers from Minnesota want to see Albert’s cell!”
The supervisor responded, “There’s not much to see; they all look
alike.” I said that yes, I knew that, but still would like to see it. The
supervisor replied, “Well, I guess I don’t see any harm in that,” and
off we went.
At the prison, as you move further into each building, you
have to go through a series of barred gates. The guards stationed
in each separately barred area only have the key required to allow
you to proceed further into the building, and do not have the key
necessary to let you out of their area. That is, to be allowed out, a
series of gates have to be opened for you, in each case by a guard
stationed outside of the gate.
The death row inmates are housed on tiers consisting of an
upper and lower row of cells, with fifteen individual cells per row.
They are continuously locked down, meaning that they are in their
cells twenty-three hours per day. Each inmate is allowed only one
hour per day out of his cell, during which time he can take a
shower or walk on the tier. Three days a week an inmate may use
his hour to go to an outdoor fenced exercise area, which is akin to
a dog run. Each inmate’s cell measures approximately six feet by
nine feet and contains a metal slab with a thin mattress for a bed, a
squat, steel toilet and sink.
C. “I’d let you walk him right out of here today.”
When we got to the tier on which Albert was housed, there was
another inmate out on the row. He had to be placed back into his
cell before we were allowed in. As we walked onto the row, there
was a noticeable hush and then a murmur of comments such as:
“Albert’s got somebody with him,” and “Who’s that with Albert?”
Some of the inmates even stuck small mirror-like objects out of
their cells in an attempt to get a look at us. When we got to
Albert’s cell, the bars were opened electronically, he was directed
in, we were motioned to step back, and then the bars were again
closed shut. As we were leaving, we struck up a conversation with
one of the death row guards, Sergeant Henry. Sergeant Henry told
us that he had been working at the prison ever since Albert arrived,
had spoken with him and had even looked at some of his legal
papers. Sergeant Henry said that he did not believe that Albert had
killed anyone, and that if it was up to him, “I’d let you walk him
right out of here today.” This was an extraordinary statement
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coming from a veteran death row guard. The experience of seeing
Albert in his cell, and hearing Sergeant Henry’s comments, was gutwrenching. We knew Albert was innocent and we had to get him
out.
D. Judge Woodard Grants Michael’s Motion for a New Trial
We waited nearly two years for Judge Woodard to rule on
Michael’s new trial motion. During this time we continued our
investigation, further developed our legal theories, completed
mental health evaluations of Albert and worked on our petition for
post-conviction relief. We needed to be very careful with our
petition because any claim that we failed to raise in the petition
would likely be waived and could not be raised in further
proceedings. This was particularly a concern with the new federal
habeas corpus provisions. Because Michael’s case was in a better
procedural posture than Albert’s, and because the Court’s ruling
on Michael’s new trial motion could have a direct impact on
Albert’s case, we concluded that it was best to hold off filing
Albert’s petition.
On March 3, 2000, Judge Woodard granted Michael’s motion
56
and ordered a new trial.
She made extensive and detailed
findings concerning the misconduct committed by the police and
the prosecution in failing to turn over to the defense exculpatory
and impeachment evidence, and regarding the discovery of new
evidence favorable to Michael. Most of Judge Woodard’s findings
applied equally to Albert. Judge Woodard concluded that the jury
had been misled and had not been given all the facts concerning
the case.
She found that the withheld exculpatory and
impeachment evidence and the new evidence was material, and if it
had been properly disclosed to the jury, there was a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the case would have been
57
different. Judge Woodard said, “This jury had a right to make its
decision based on complete, correct facts and the correct law;
however, this jury was misled about certain areas of the law and
many of the facts of this case such that we could have no
58
confidence in the outcome of this trial.” The State chose not to
56. State of Louisiana v. Michael Ray Graham, Jr., Crim. Docket No. 28,734B
(Third Judicial Dist. Ct., Union Parish, La. March 3, 2000) (granting motion for
new trial).
57. Id. at 36-37.
58. Id. at 38.
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appeal Judge Woodard’s order. Thus it was left with the decision of
whether or not to retry Michael, and accordingly began an
extensive investigation of the murders in an attempt to develop
evidence for such a trial.
We analyzed Judge Woodard’s decision and concluded that at
least fifteen of the grounds that she found justified a new trial for
Michael were also present in Albert’s case. We wrote to the State,
explaining our position in detail and also pointing out that there
were several additional issues that required a new trial for Albert.
These issues included the due process violation inherent in the
failure to determine whether Albert was even competent to stand
trial at the time he was tried in 1987, the grossly ineffective
assistance that Albert received from his defense counsel, and
additional evidence showing that the prosecutor knowingly allowed
Olan Wayne Brantley to lie at trial and covered up the lie in front
of the jury. Chuck called the assistant attorney general whom we
had met with at the hearing on Michael’s new trial motion and
reminded him that the two cases, although tried separately, were so
similar that they should be treated in the same manner. He agreed
and said that any decision he made on Michael’s case would be
applied to Albert’s case as well .
X. THE STATE DISMISSES THE MURDER CHARGES
A. The Written Reasons for Dismissal
On December 11, 2000, the State announced to Judge
Woodard that it had decided not to retry Michael and would
dismiss the murder charges against him. Judge Woodard insisted
that the State prepare written reasons explaining its decision. We
again contacted the assistant attorney general and he told us that
he agreed that the cases against Albert and Michael were indivisible
and that the State would dismiss the charges against Albert as well.
Once the State filed its written reasons for dismissal, Michael could
be released from Angola.
However, Albert was in a different position. He had not been
granted a new trial by the court and the judgment of guilt and
sentence of death had not been vacated. Fortunately, Nick had an
idea. He believed that we could simply prepare a stipulation and
joint motion for new trial that both us and the State would sign,
and then ask Judge Woodard to grant the joint motion. The State
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agreed to this procedure. We began to think that everything now
would go smoothly and we could have a pre-Christmas release of
both Michael and Albert. That was not to be. The State was either
unable or unwilling to complete the written dismissal papers
requested by Judge Woodard prior to Christmas. We never knew
for sure, but it seemed to be another example of the politics of the
death penalty. It was as if someone had decided that it would not
look right to release two death row inmates right before Christmas,
even if they were innocent.
Finally, on December 27, 2000, the State issued its written
59
reasons for dismissal.
The State noted that the “cases against
defendants Graham and Burrell are as closely related as to be
virtually identical. Therefore, the State of Louisiana has joined
60
defendant, Burrell, in moving for a new trial.”
The State
concluded that there was “a total lack of credible evidence linking
Graham and/or Burrell to the crime,” and said that it would be “a
breach of ethics” for the prosecutors to proceed to trial against
61
them.
The State announced that it was reopening the
investigation of the murders and dismissing the charges against
62
Michael and Albert.
B. An Unexpected Problem
Meanwhile, in conjunction with the Attorney General’s Office,
we filed a joint motion for a new trial in Albert’s case. We expected
that the court would grant the motion, thereby permitting Albert to
be released at the same time as Michael. In fact, that afternoon we
became so sure that the release was imminent that we immediately
headed to the airport to travel to Louisiana. Just before we left our
office, however, we received a call from the judge’s clerk indicating
that the judge was not going to sign our papers that day and
wanted to have a conference call on Thursday.
We had the conference call from Nick’s office in New Orleans
on Thursday morning, December 28. Judge Woodard told us that
she understood that the Attorney General’s Office had joined with
us in requesting that Albert’s conviction be vacated and that he be
59. Written Reasons for Dismissal in State of Louisiana v. Michael Ray Graham,
Jr. and Albert Ronnie Burrell, Crim. Docket Nos. 28,734B and 28,734A (Third
Judicial Dist. Ct., Union Parish, La.) (filed December 28, 2000).
60. Id. at 1.
61. Id. at 2.
62. Id. at 3.
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granted a new trial. She asserted that even though both sides
agreed Albert ought to be released, that did not necessarily mean
that she had to agree. This was a shocking moment. I thought that
Nick was going to leap out of his chair and go right through the
ceiling. Judge Woodard insisted upon having a hearing in open
court before granting any motion regarding Albert’s case. Judge
Woodard said that she would have to consider the matter very
carefully before making any decision. She did agree, however, to
expedite the hearing and it was scheduled for Tuesday, January 2 at
9:00 a.m. in her courtroom in Farmerville.
C. Michael is Released, Albert is Not
Judge Woodard’s decision to hold a hearing in Albert’s case
did not effect Michael’s case. Later that day, Thursday, December
28, Michael walked out of Angola, was driven to Baton Rouge by
one of his lawyers, Michele Fournet, got on a bus and rode straight
to his mother’s home in Virginia. We were left having to explain to
Albert why Michael was released that day and he was not. We tried
to do this over the telephone from Nick’s office, but Albert was
virtually incoherent. He did not seem to understand, or perhaps
even hear, what we were saying. By this time, news of the state’s
dismissal of the charges against Michael and Albert had been on
the radio and in the papers and had certainly spread throughout
the prison. Nick talked to officials he knew at the prison and
strongly expressed his concern that perhaps certain guards or other
inmates were harassing Albert by saying things such as: “If you’re
really supposed to get out, how come no one has come to get you?”
Chuck and I decided that we had to visit Albert and explain
why Michael was being released and he was not. We were worried
that it would be confusing and painful for Albert if we went to see
him, but could not take him out with us. Nonetheless, on Friday,
December 29, Chuck and I visited Albert at Angola. It went much
better than we had expected. There was a palpable buzz about the
place over Michael’s release the previous day. Warden Burl Cain
had told the newspapers that he could not recall another time
when an inmate had been released from death row directly “onto
63
the streets.” We talked briefly with the guard working in the small
63. Duane M. Baillio, Freed Men Won’t Be Retried, RUSTON DAILY LEADER,
December 31, 2000, at 1A. THE ANGOLITE, which is the prisoner-published news
magazine of the Louisiana State Penitentiary, also reported that “Graham and
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office just inside the RC (the building that houses death row). She,
as everyone, wanted to know when Albert would be getting out.
Posted on one wall in her office was a large white, erasable board
that listed all the death row inmates organized by the tier where
they were housed. There was a blank spot where Michael’s name
had been—I could only faintly make out his name.
We met with Albert in the visiting room. He, of course, was
shackled and in a prison jump suit, but seemed much different
than when we had previously visited him. He was excited and
genuinely smiling, something I had never seen before. He had
trouble sitting still and bounced around in his chair as we talked.
The distress that had been so apparent during the previous day’s
64
telephone call was gone. We explained that we had to appear in
court on Tuesday for a hearing in his case. We assured Albert that
we were doing everything we could to get him released as soon as
possible, but cautioned him to be patient. Albert clearly believed
he would be released on Tuesday after the hearing, but Chuck and
I had no way of knowing if that would be true. Albert said he was
saving a clean pair of blue jeans to wear when he was released.
Albert told us that he had heard news reports on his radio
about the charges being dismissed against he and Michael and
about them being released. Amazingly, he had also witnessed
Michael walking out of the prison on the television that was affixed
to the wall across from his cell on death row. I could not imagine
how Albert must have felt to see Michael leave while he remained
in his cell.
Following our visit with Albert, Chuck and I stopped by one of
the more curious features at Angola, the Louisiana State
Penitentiary Museum which is housed in a building just outside
65
Angola’s front gate. It contains historical displays and mementos,
exhibits about Angola’s depiction in movies and books, inmate art
work, and various other things. Oh yes, you can also buy souvenirs.

Burrell were the first in anyone’s memory to walk straight off death row into the
light of freedom.” Lane Nelson, Death Watch: Breaking the Death Grip, THE ANGOLITE,
vol. 26, no. 2, March/April/May 2001, at 18 (discussing Michael’s and Albert’s
release from death row).
64. I later learned that Michael, before leaving prison, wrote Albert a letter
reassuring him that everything would be okay and that he would be released too.
Apparently the letter eventually made its way through the prison to Albert and was
read to him. Perhaps this act of humanity by Michael was what had helped relieve
Albert’s distress. Perhaps our visit helped as well.
65. See www.angolamuseum.org.
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The person staffing the museum was quite friendly (we were the
only visitors) and eager to show us the museum’s exhibit of the old
electric chair. It was on display in a special room painted to look
like the death chamber with various items used in the execution
process on hand. On the wall were mugshot photos of every
inmate who had been executed. It was all rather macabre.
The museum staff person told us that there had been quite a
lot of excitement at the prison the day before because of an
inmate’s release off of death row. We told her that we knew, and
that we were there because of his co-defendant. She said, “Well, if
they are innocent, they should be released.” I cannot count the
number of times that I have heard this statement in connection
with Albert’s case. It is such an obvious truism that it always strikes
me as a rather odd thing to say. I have thought from time to time
of calling the Angola museum and suggesting they put together an
exhibit picturing Michael and Albert.
XI. ALBERT’S RELEASE—JANUARY 2, 2001
On January 2, 2001, Chuck and I appeared in Judge
Woodard’s courtroom in Farmerville for the hearing on Albert’s
new trial motion. At the hearing, the State was asked to explain
why it had agreed that Albert’s case was virtually identical to
Michael’s and had dismissed the charges against Albert. Chuck
and I then presented additional evidence for setting aside the
conviction that were unique to Albert’s case. I discussed the due
process issue of the prosecutor’s knowing failure to raise the issue
of Albert’s competency prior to trial and failure to disclose the
prior judicial determination of incompetency, and his affirmative
misleading of the jury by falsely stating that he knew of “no mental
disease or defect” suffered by Albert. Chuck presented further
evidence that the prosecutor lied to the jury by knowingly
permitting Olan Wayne Brantley to testify falsely, by covering up
Brantley’s falsehood, and then by making an outrageous argument
in closing on Brantley’s truthfulness. Judge Woodard also asked if
there were any relatives of the victims present in court. The only
person there was a cousin of Callie Frost’s whom we had known for
a long time and had asked to come. He told Judge Woodard that
he believed Albert and Michael had not killed the Frosts.
Judge Woodard was concerned about whether she could grant
a new trial in Albert’s case considering its procedural posture—that
is, the case was at the post-conviction stage and Albert’s earlier
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motions for new trial had been denied. Judge Woodard noted that
the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure (“Criminal Code”)
states that a motion for new trial based upon new and material
evidence has to be filed within one year after the verdict or
66
judgment of the trial court. We were, of course, far beyond that
time limit. In our motion, however, we relied upon Article 851(5)
of the Criminal Code, which provides that the court may grant a
new trial whenever: “The court is of the opinion that the ends of
justice would be served by the granting of a new trial, although the
defendant may not be entitled to a new trial as a matter of strict
67
legal right.”
The commentary to the Criminal Code indicates that this
section gives plenary authority to the judge to order a new trial to
do justice, even if a motion for a new trial is not based on a strict
68
legal ground.
Moreover, the commentary indicates that this
section replaced the provision in the prior code which gave the
court authority to grant a new trial with the consent of the
prosecutor even if the defendant did not have a valid legal reason
69
for a new trial. Judge Woodard, however, did not seem satisfied
and wanted case law support for our position. We gave her a case
70
that Nick had suggested: State v. Crockett. In that case, the court
held that it was proper to waive the one-year requirement for a
motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence to
71
insure that justice was served.
After hearing all of the arguments, Judge Woodard recessed to
her chambers to consider our motion. After a brief time, which
seemed like much longer, she returned to the bench and granted
our motion. I noted that the time was 9:39 a.m. For me this was a
moment of jubilation and great relief, all of which, of course, had
to be kept inside as a matter of professional decorum. Moreover,
we had to quickly gather up our materials as the court clerk began
immediately calling the day’s calendar of misdemeanor matters—a
remarkable contrast.
Chuck and I then began the over four-hour drive to Angola to
get Albert out. The drive took us through back roads of both
66.
67.
68.
1997).
69.
70.
71.

LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 853 (West 1997).
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 851(5) (West 1997).
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 851 (Official Revision Comment) (West
Id.
537 So. 2d 242 (La. Ct. 4 App.1996).
Id. at 244.
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Louisiana and Mississippi. It was certainly our best trip ever to the
prison. Meanwhile, Nick was in New Orleans working the
telephones with corrections officials and the Attorney General’s
Office to finalize Albert’s release.
When we arrived at the prison, word of Albert’s release had
already spread and there were newspaper and television reporters
there to meet us. In addition, we were met by a public relations
person from the Department of Corrections and the prison’s
lawyer, Bruce Dodd. Mr. Dodd told us that Albert was ready and
that we could meet with him. He escorted us back to death row.
For the first time, I was entering the prison without having
relinquished my wallet and being patted down. When I mentioned
this to Mr. Dodd, he said, “Well, I assume you guys don’t have any
weapons on you today.” We were met at the front office of the
72
death row building by several guards and Assistant Warden Lee.
Albert was waiting for us in the same visiting room where we
had met with him the previous Friday. He was, true to his word,
dressed in a crisp, clean pair of blue jeans and had a broad smile.
Even though he was about to be released, Albert surprisingly still
was shackled. Mr. Dodd explained that prison rules required the
chains to remain on until Albert completed all the paperwork
necessary for his release. At our request the guards allowed a
handcuff to be undone so that Albert could sign the papers. Mr.
Dodd went through all of the paperwork, of course having to read
it and explain it all to Albert. Albert was asked to sign papers
indicating that he had received all of his belongings from the
prison, and agreeing that if anything had been left behind it could
be destroyed. He was also asked to sign papers acknowledging that
the prison had given him a check for $10, which, unbelievable as it
sounds, was Albert’s only compensation from the State of Louisiana
for being wrongfully convicted and spending over thirteen years on
73
death row.
In addition, Albert received a memo from Warden Cain which
was directed to “all concerned” and dated January 2, 2001. It
stated: “the above-referenced inmate [Albert] is being released
from the Louisiana State Penitentiary by virtue of court order
effective January 2, 2001. This will serve as your authority to release
72. Warden Cain was not available as we were told he had left that day to go
to New Orleans for the Sugar Bowl.
73. To be fair, the State also gave Albert a denim jacket, which was several
sizes too big.
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this offender from LSP count.” This was a piece of paper that
Albert could show to anyone indicating that he had been officially
released. He clutched it as tightly as he could, as you might
imagine. Only after all of the papers had been signed did the
guards release Albert’s chains. To see them come off one by one
was extraordinary.
We then sat with Albert, the prison lawyer, and a number of
guards awaiting Nick’s arrival at the prison. Chuck asked one of
the guards if he could arrange to have Sergeant Henry come by,
and he did. I first saw Sergeant Henry approaching in the hallway
outside the visiting room. I asked if he remembered me, and he
replied that he did. It apparently was not a typical experience for a
couple of Minnesota lawyers to be on a death row tier at Angola.
Sergeant Henry told me that he was happy about what we had done
for Albert. He again said that he had known Albert the entire time
Albert had been at Angola, and did not think that he “did it.”
Sergeant Henry then gave Albert a warm farewell and wished him
well.
At one point, one of the guards began asking Albert who his
friends were in prison. This same guard had earlier, rather sternly
and almost sneeringly, told Albert to take care of himself and not
get into any more trouble on the outside. Albert said that Feltus
had been his closest friend because Feltus had read to him. The
room was quiet for a moment as nobody said anything because
everyone knew that Feltus Taylor had been executed in June of
2000. Then, the guard who had been questioning Albert simply
74
said, “Feltus was a good convict.”
All the while we were waiting, the walkie talkies that the guards
were carrying crackled with various reports, many of which were in
a prison language that was hard for us to understand. On one
occasion, however, the announcement came over: “count clear.” A
guard mentioned this to Albert, saying that it was a good thing that
the count had been called “clear” even though Albert was not in his
cell, because otherwise the guards would be coming to look for
him. In other words, as the release memo indicated, Albert was no
longer part of the count at Angola.
Shortly before 5:00 p.m., Albert walked out of Angola
clutching his release memo. He was asked to sign the ledger at the

74. See Lane Nelson, Death Watch: Dying to Please, THE ANGOLITE, vol. 25, no. 3,
May/June 2000 at 22 (discussing Feltus Taylor and his execution on June 6, 2000).
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front gate, and then was greeted by his sister Estell, his brother
Larry, Nick, Nick’s twelve year-old son, Miles, Chuck, and I. I will
always remember Nick exhorting over and over again to Albert that
he was now in “the free world” and touching the “free ground.”
After meeting briefly with the press, we drove to a nearby
roadside restaurant for dinner. For his first meal in freedom,
Albert ordered catfish fillets, french fries, Texas toast and a salad.
After dinner, as we left the restaurant, Albert could finally look up
and see the stars—just one of many things he had missed during all
those years he was wrongfully imprisoned.
Truly, “It’s good to be free.”
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